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This article looks inside the black box of order flows to understand why order flows 
models of exchange rate are more competitive than traditional models of exchange rate. We 
set a theoretical model that relies on a behavioural exchange rate model and a microstructure 
model.  The  model  puts  forward  three  results.  First,  simulations  replicate  stylised  facts 
observed  in  the  foreign  exchange  market.  Secondly,  the  model  shows  that  the  foreign 
exchange market is intrinsically inefficient. Incoming information is distorted by behavioural 
noise  and  microstructure  noise.  Thirdly,  order  flows  models  of  exchange  rate  provide  an 
answer  to  the  exchange  rate  disconnection  puzzle.  Indeed,  order  flows  contain  processed 
information i.e. a time varying weight of fundamental information, behavioural information 
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1. Introduction 
 
Following  decades  of  empirical  failure  to  explain  and  forecast  exchange  rates 
dynamics based on traditional exchange rate models (Meese and Rogoff, (1983), Cheung et 
al.  (2005)),  the  recent  microstructure  literature  offers  promising  results.  Microstructure 
models based on order flows provide better explanatory and predictive powers in forecasting 
exchange  rate  dynamics  than  traditional  models;  especially  at  short  horizons  (Evans  and 
Lyons  (2002a,  2002b),  Danielsson  et  al.  (2002),  Berger  et  al.  (2008),  Chinn  and  Moore 
(2008)).  To justify  this  performance,  order  flows  theorists  claim  that  order  flow  includes 
private  information  about  exchange  rate  fundamentals  (Lyons  (2001),  Evans  and  Lyons 
(2008), Chinn and Moore (2008), Rime, Sarno and Sojli (2010)). However, many studies 
counter this view. Such studies show that order flows only convey information about liquidity 
effects, temporary preferences and other demand shocks. Both views raise a debate between 
respectively the proponents of the strong flow centric view and the ones of the weak flow 
centric view. 
This paper defends the idea that order flows contain information from both the strong 
and the weak flow centric view; but not solely. The article investigates inside the black box of 
order flows to unveil the various types of information contained in order flows. This question 
is becoming increasingly important as the black box has been shifted from understanding 
exchange rate determination to understanding order flow determination. We set a theoretical 
model of the foreign exchange market that describes how the initial information arriving to 
market agents is embedded into the final price of the currency. 
The  most  related  studies  to  this paper  are  Bachetta  and  Van  Wincoop  (2006)  and 
Evans (2010). Bachetta and Van Wincoop (2006) provide an analytical framework which 
regroups  both  the  strong  and  the  weak  flow  centric  views.  Their  main  finding  is  that 
information  heterogeneity  disconnects  the  exchange  rate  from  observed  macroeconomic 
fundamentals in the short run, while there is a close relationship in the long run. At the same 
time, there is a close link between exchange rate dynamics and order flows over all horizons. 
Evans (2010) presents a theoretical model to analyse the links between high frequency spot 
exchange  rates,  order  flows  and  macroeconomic  developments.  Evans  finds  that  trades 
between dealers and customers convey information to dealers about the current state of the 
economy which dealers then use to revise their spot exchange rate quotes. 
The model presented here departs from Bachetta and Van Wincoop (2006) and Evans 
(2010)  in  several  ways.  Indeed,  both  models  miss  a  major  component  of  exchange  rate 
determination in the short run: agents’ behaviours (Cheung and Wong (2000), Cheung and 
Chinn  (2001),  Cheung,  Chinn  and  Marsh  (2004)).  Our  modeling  approach  integrates  not 
solely the public and private information as in Bachetta and Van Wincoop (2006) and Evans 
(2010) but also behavioural components affecting customers and dealers decisions. Our model 
therefore  merges  two  strands  of  the  literature:  behavioural  exchange  rate  models  and 
microstructure  models  of  exchange  rate.  The  model  puts  forward  three  results.  First, 
simulations replicate important stylised facts observed in the foreign exchange market. In the 
short run, the exchange rate is disconnected from its fundamentals but not from order flows. 
In the long run, the exchange rate returns towards its fundamental value and remains still 
close  to  order  flows.  Customer  and  interdealer  order  flows  are  highly  correlated  with 
exchange rate dynamics at all horizons. Besides the hot potato effect magnifies the amount of 
interdealer order flows relative to the amount of customer order flows. Secondly, the model 
indicates  that  the  foreign  exchange  market  is  intrinsically  inefficient.  The  introduction  of 
incoming information in the final price of the currency is distorted by agents’ behaviours 
(behavioural noise) and by the trading mechanism peculiar to the foreign exchange market 
(microstructure noise). Thirdly, the model explains why order flows provide an answer to the   3 
exchange rate disconnection puzzle. Order flows contain information processed by agents 
while traditional models only  consider raw information. Processed information includes a 
time varying  weight  of  fundamental  information  (both  public  and  private),  behavioural 
information  (both  public  and  private)  and  microstructure  information.  Conversely, 
information considered in traditional models only includes public fundamental information. 
The difference in the types of information considered by order flows models and traditional 
models explain why order flows models provide higher explanatory and predictive powers of 
exchange rate dynamics relative to traditional models. 
The remainder of the paper comprises 5 sections. Section 2 provides evidence of the 
high explanatory and predictive powers of order flows models. Section 3 proposes a literature 
survey concerning the information contained in order flows. Section 4 presents a theoretical 
model of the foreign exchange market and exposes the simulations provided by the model. 
Section 5 addresses the question of foreign exchange market efficiency and explains why 
order flows models come as a resolution to the exchange rate disconnection puzzle. Section 6 
concludes. 
 
2. On the competitive performances of order flows models of exchange rate 
 
In a pioneered work, Evans and Lyons (2001, 2002) came up with an hybrid model 
based on private information and public information to explain exchange rate dynamics. The 
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With st, the (log of) the spot exchange rate (an increase in s is equal to an appreciation 
of the domestic currency); (it   it*), the interest rate differential between the domestic and the 
foreign country; Xt, the net cumulated order flow.   stands for the first difference of the series. 
 
Macroeconomic fundamentals (here the interest rate differential (it   it*)) represents 
public information known by all agents. Order flows 
2 Xt represent private information known 
by a minority of agents. Order flow is defined as the net of buyer  and seller initiated currency 
transactions. Intuitively, order flow represents a willingness to back one's beliefs on future 
exchange rate dynamics, with real money. 
Evans  and  Lyons  tested  their  model  on  the  deutschemark/dollar,  yen/dollar  and 
pound/dollar in daily  frequency  from May 1996 to August 1996. They  show that private 
information (order flows) explain at best 65 % of the variance of exchange rates. On the 
contrary, public information (the interest rate differential) only explains at best 5 % of the 
variance of exchange rates (a figure close to the ones obtained with traditional exchange rate 
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Table 1: Literature survey of the in sample performance of order flows models 
Authors  Period  Frequency  Exogenous  Explanatory Power (R2) 
Fan and Lyons 
(2000) 
January 1993   
June 1999  Monthly  Customer 
order flows 
Euro/Dollar  0,16 
Yen/Dollar  0,15 
Evans and Lyons 
(2002a) 
May 1996   
August 1996  Daily  Interdealer 
order flow 
Deutschemark/Dollar  0,67 
Yen/Dollar  0,43 
Evans and Lyons 
(2002b) 
May 1996   
August 1996  Daily  Interdealer 
order flow 
Pound/Dollar  0,29 











Euro/Dollar  0,45 
Yen/Dollar  0,67 
Pound/Dollar  0,01 
Euro/Pound  0,01 
Berger et al. 
(2008) 
January 1999   
December 
2004 
Daily  Interdealer 
order flow 
Euro/Dollar  0,46 
Yen/Dollar  0,54 
Berger et al. 
(2008) 
January 1999   
December 
2004 
Weekly  Interdealer 
order flow 
Euro/Dollar  0,43 
Yen/Dollar  0,48 
Berger et al. 
(2008) 
January 1999   
December 
2004 
Monthly  Interdealer 
order flow 
Euro/Dollar  0,21 
Yen/Dollar  0,34 





Monthly  Interdealer 
order flow 
Euro/Dollar  0,06 
Yen/Dollar  0,24 
NB: The regression method used in the studies mentionned in table 1 is ordinary least squares (OLS) 
 
 
Table 1 shows that the explanatory power of order flows model far exceeds the one of 
traditional models of exchange rate. For daily and weekly frequencies, the coefficients of 
determination (R2) spread between 30 % and 67 % (except for Danielsson et al. (2002)). At 
such frequencies, traditional exchange rate models usually provide R2 close to or less than 10 
%. Beyond the explanatory performance of exchange rates, order flows provide also better 
exchange  rate  forecasts  than  traditional  models.  Numerous  studies  show  that  order  flows 
models beat the random walk in the short run (Evans and Lyons (2001, 2002a, 2002b, 2005, 
2006), Lindahl and Rime (2006), Rime et al. (2010)). 
The results from order flows models have to be put into perspective. The relationship 
between order flows and exchange rate dynamics is strong at intradaily, daily and weekly 
frequencies but declines at lower frequencies. For example, table 1 shows that in Berger et al. 
(2008) order flows explain about 50 % of the variance of exchange rates at daily and weekly 
frequencies. At lower frequencies, for instance monthly frequencies, the R2 declines gradually 
and falls to 34 % for the yen/dollar exchange rate and to 21 % for the euro/dollar exchange 
rate. The same observation stands in Chinn and Moore (2008). Therefore the explanatory 
power  of  exchange  rate  variation  by  order  flows  models  falls  at  monthly  frequencies.  In 
somes  cases,  the  explanatory  power  comes  even  close  to  the  one  offered  by  traditional 
exchange rate models (see Chinn and Moore (2008)) while in other cases the explanatory 
power is still higher than the explanatory power of traditional exchange rate models based on   5 
fundamentals (see  Berger et al. (2008))
3. Still, despite the relative fall in the explanatory 
power of order flows models at monthly frequencies, the literature review in table 1 provides 
evidence of the high explanatory and predictive performances by order flows models at short 
run horizons (from intradaily to weekly frequencies). As a result, one may wonder which 
types  of  information  do  order  flows  contain  to  justify  such  a  high  explanatory  power  of 
exchange rates at short horizons? 
 
3. The informational content of order flows: a literature review 
 
According  to  Lyons  (2001),  order  flow  contains  private  information.  Private 
information can be split into three components: fundamental information, liquidity effects and 
portfolio balance effects. 
Fundamental  information  includes  private  information  about  exchange  rate 
fundamentals. For example, if a central bank intervenes in the foreign exchange market by 
transmitting a positive order flow to a market maker, then this market maker will infer a 
likely appreciation of the currency. Fundamental information is supposed to have a permanent 
effect on currency prices. 
Inventory or liquidity effects refer to information about transfers of unwanted currency 
positions between market makers. For instance, if a market maker A has to absorb a large 
stock of currencies from a market maker B, the market maker A will bear more risks (mainly 
liquidity and valuation risks). As a result, the market maker A will ask a higher risk premium 
(hence a lower price) to buy the currencies of market maker B. This risk premium will only 
have a transitory effect on the price of the currency since it will disappear after the trade 
between  the  two  market makers.  Thus  inventory  effects  only  have  transitory  effects  on 
currency prices. 
Portfolio balance  effects  relates  to  agents’  decisions  independently  of  fundamental 
movements. For example, an import export firm can operate in the market to convert foreign 
currencies in domestic currencies independently of fundamental movements. The effect of 
portfolio balance is assumed to be permanent on currency prices. 
 
A lot of studies have analysed the informational content of order flows. The literature 
is split between two separate views: the strong flow centric view and the weak flow centric 
view. 
 
The strong flow centric view states that order flows contains in majority fundamental 
information. Order flows are correlated with news about exchange rate fundamentals and have 
thus a permanent effect on currency prices (Ito et al. (1998), Rime (2000), Evans and Lyons 
(2001, 2002, 2005a, 2008), Love and Payne (2004), Marsh and O’Rourke (2005)).  
Love and Payne (2004) base their study on intraday interdealer order flows on the 
euro/dollar, dollar/pound and pound/euro, from the 28th September 1999 to the 24th July 
2000. They show that “even information that is publicly and simultaneously released to all 
market participants is largely impounded into prices via the key micro level price determinant 
   order  flow”.  Love  and  Payne  find  that  between  a  half  and  two thirds  of  price  relevant 
information is incorporated into prices via order flows. 
Marsh and O’Rourke (2005) use daily customer order flows from August 2002 to June 
2004 on bilateral exchange rates between the dollar, the euro, the pound and the yen. They 
                                                 
3 Recently, Carlini et al. (2010) show that in the long run (about 5 years), the cointegration relationship between 
order flows and stock prices is not significant. However by using more suitable tools, they show that order flows 
and stock prices are fractionnally cointegrated or even still cointegrated if we correct order flows by the volumes 
of transactions in the market.   6 
show that inventory effects play a minor role in the informational content of order flows. A 
major role is attributed to fundamental effects. Particularly, when decomposing order flows 
by types of clients, they show that coefficients associated to leveraged firms such as hedge 
funds are very large compared to other flows (such as flows coming from unleveraged firm 
(mutual funds) and non financial corporations (multinationals)). They  conclude that flows 
coming from leveraged funds are more informative about fundamentals than flows coming 
from other customers
4. 
  Evans and Lyons (2008) estimate an intraday model using interdealer order flows on 
the deutschemark/dollar market from May 1 to August 31, 1996. They show that roughly two 
thirds  of  the  total  effect  of  macro  news  on  the  deutschemark/dollar  exchange  rate  is 
transmitted via order flows. They claim that order flows contribute significantly to changing 
currency prices at all times, but that they contribute more to changing prices immediately after 
news arrivals about fundamentals. 
Rime, Sarno and Sojli (2010) uses daily interdealer order flows for the euro, the pound 
and the yen against the dollar between February 13, 2004 and February 14, 2005. They argue 
that  news  about  macroeconomic  fundamentals  are  important  determinants  of  order  flows. 
They find that “order flow is intimately linked to both news on fundamentals and to changes 
in expectations about these fundamentals”. 
 
According  to  the  weak  flow  centric  view  order  flows  do  not  transmit  private 
information about fundamentals in currency prices. Rather, order flows convey information 
about liquidity effects, temporary preferences and other demand shocks. Order flows have 
thus a transitory effect on asset prices. Evidence for the weak flow centric view is based on 
results provided by econometric analyses as well as survey studies. 
Concerning survey studies, Cheung, Chinn and Marsh (2004) base their analysis on a 
sample of UK based foreign exchange dealers in March/April 1998. They found that after 
analysing order flows, “traders do not vary their bid ask spread either very often or for some 
of  the  reasons  thought  important  in  the  microstructure  literature”.  Microstructure  theory 
suggests that three main factors can lead traders to change their spreads: liquidity effects, 
portfolio balance effects and fundamental information. Cheung et al. (2004) add that “traders 
were asked their reasons for changing their quoted spreads from the market convention and 
results suggest that the liquidity effect is dominant. This was confirmed in conversations with 
traders”. 
In the same vein, Gehrig and Menkhoff (2006) sent questionnaires to professional 
market participants in Germany in July 1992. They show that “flows are more informative 
about semifundamental private information. In other words, order flows contain information 
about short term trading objectives or liquidity considerations of other traders that may affect 
short term  price  movements,  but  that  will  not  affect  medium term  asset  prices.  Such 
information  may  be  interim  price  relevant  but  irrelevant  in  the  long  run”.  Gehrig  and 
Menkhoff add that “flow analysis does not seem to be used as a tool to learn about the 
fundamental information”. 
                                                 
4 The view of Marsh and O’Rourke (2005) may be confirmed by Corsetti et al. (2001) who claim that a lot of 
operators believe that hedge funds have an informational advantage relative to the rest of the market concerning 
asset prices.  However another interpretation of the high coefficients associated to order flows coming from 
hedge  funds  could  be  related  to  the  fact  that  hedge  funds  speculate  aggressively  and  thus  produce  huge 
movements in the market and hence in currency prices. Therefore order flows from hedge funds would be more 
related to speculative forces rather than to exchange rate fundamentals (Wei and Kim (1998)). Survey results 
among practitioners reinforce this argument since speculative forces are considered as a major determinant of 
exchange rates at short run horizons (Cheung and Wong (2000), Cheung and Chinn (2001) and Cheung, Chin 
and Marsh (2004)).   7 
Concerning econometric studies, Breedon and Vitale (2004) analyse daily brokered 
interdealer trades in the dollar/euro exchange rate from August 2000 to mid January 2001. 
They show that order flows provide above all, information about portfolio balance effects 
rather than information about macroeconomic fundamentals.  
Froot and Ramadorai  (2005) analyse a sample  of daily institutional investor flows 
transactions for 18 exchange rates against the US dollar from June 1994 to February 2001. 
They show that order flows have a transitory impact on exchange rates and do not convey 
information  about  macroeconomic  fundamentals  to  market makers.  “Flows  appear  to  be 
bound up with transitory currency under  and overreactions, but unrelated to the permanent 
component of exchange rate surprises. Yet, these exchange rate surprises are strongly related 
to important fundamental variables, as predicted by theory”. 
Berger et al. (2008) analyse monthly interdealer order flows from January 1999 to 
December 2004 on the euro/dollar and the yen/dollar exchange rates. Their analysis points to 
an important role for liquidity effects in the relationship between order flows and exchange 
rates. They provide evidence that the relationship between order flows and exchange rates is 
strong at daily and weekly frequencies but weakens significantly from monthly frequencies. 
Chinn and Moore (2008) analyse monthly interdealer order flows from January 1999 
to January 2007 for the dollar/euro and dollar/yen exchange rates. They build an exchange 
rate model based on a combination of the traditional monetary model of exchange rate and the 
Evans Lyons microstructure approach. They show that “cumulative order flow tracks liquidity 
shocks and provides the ‘missing link’ to augmenting the explanatory power of conventional 
monetary models”. 
 
  This paper defends the idea that order flows contain information from both the strong 
and the weak flow centric view; but not solely. The article investigates inside the black box of 
order flows to disentangle the types of information contained in order flows. This question is 
becoming  increasingly  important  as  the  literature  has  shifted  the  black  box  from 
understanding exchange rate determination to understanding order flow determination. 
We build a theoretical  model that considers  all the information market agents can 
embed in currency prices. Our modeling approach integrates not solely the public and private 
information as in previous works (Bachetta and Van Wincoop (2006) and Evans (2010)) but 
also  behavioural  components  affecting  customers  and  dealers  decisions.  Our  model  thus 
merges two strands of the literature on exchange rates: behavioural exchange rate models and 
microstructure models of exchange rate. The global model takes account of heterogeneous 
agents  (Frankel  and  Froot  (1986)),  the  appearance  of  rumours  (Dominguez  and  Panthaki 
(2006)), anchoring effects (Kahneman and Tversky (1974), Osler (2002)), status quo bias 
(Kahneman and Knetsch (1991), De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2008)) and the characteristics of 
the trading mechanism peculiar to the foreign exchange market (Lyons (1997, 2001)). 
 
4. A theoretical model of the foreign exchange market 
 
4.1 Hypotheses of the model 
 
  The model relies on two blocks. The first block is a behavioural model (De Grauwe 
and  Grimaldi  (2007))  that provides  the  characteristics  of  customers  faced by  dealers.  We 
assume  customers  have  heterogeneous  expectations  and  are  split  between  two  main 
categories: chartists and fundamentalists. The second block is a microstructure model that 
represents the trading mechanism of the foreign exchange market. The microstructure model 
is  a  simultaneous trade  model  that  has  a  decentralised  and  multiple  dealers  structure  as 
empirically observed in the foreign exchange market. Our model is based on Lyons (1997,   8 
2001)  with  added  elements  from  Bachetta  and  van  Wincoop  (2006).  The  microstructure 
model presents three advantages. First, it considers interdealer trading that accounts for two 
thirds of the trades in the foreign exchange market. Secondly, it takes account of customer 
order flows as the primary source of private information for dealers. Besides, dealers learn 
about private information from other dealers through the observation of order flows. Thus the 
model  assumes  dealers  have  access  to  both  public  and  private  information.  Thirdly,  we 
suppose risk averse dealers as empirically observed in the foreign exchange market. Table 2 
summarizes the timing of the model. 
 
Table 2: Timing of the model 
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  The  timing  of  the  model  is  described  as  follows.  First,  customers  form  their 
expectations based on their stock of information and their proper models of exchange rate 
determination.  At  the  same  time,  dealers  set  their  price
5 based  on  public  information. 
Customers then ask dealers about their listed price and choose their optimal dealer according 
to the prices set by dealers. 
Trades in the microstructure model are split into two periods. In the first period the 
chosen  dealers  trade  with  their  customers.  Such  dealers  observe  the  flows  coming  from 
                                                 
5 Since in the foreign exchange market, the bid/ask spread is low due to a high degree of liquidity, we assume a 
bid/ask spread equal to zero in our model.   9 
customers and try to infer the private information contained in customer order flows. In the 
second period, dealers trade among other dealers to adjust their stock of risky asset in two 
ways; either to satisfy the net demand of their customers or to take positions on currencies. 
In  our  model  the  price  of  the  currency  is  affected  through  two  channels:  a  direct 
channel and an indirect channel. In the direct channel, the price of the currency can change 
with the arrival of public news even if there is no trade in the market. In the indirect channel, 
private information coming from customers affect currency prices through order flows
6. 
Sections 4.2 and 4.3 describe the structure of the model. 
 
4.2 The behavioural model 
 
The behavioural model is based on an heterogeneous agents structure (Frankel and 
Froot (1986), De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2007)). The model assumes customers can choose 
between  two  forecasting  rules:  a  chartist  rule  and  a  fundamentalist  rule.  Fundamentalists 
forecast exchange rates based on the spread between the current exchange rate st and the 
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Thus  if  the  exchange  rate  is  over appreciated  (under appreciated)  relative  to  its 
fundamental value, fundamentalists will expect the currency to depreciate (appreciate). The 
parameter α1 represents the speed at which the exchange rate returns towards its fundamental 
value. The higher α1 the stronger the return force of exchange rates towards their fundamental 
value.  The  fundamental  exchange  rate  t s  is  determined  by  the  interest  rate  differential 
between the two countries (it – it*): 
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Thus when the exchange rate has appreciated (depreciated) in the past; chartists expect 
a further appreciation (depreciation) of the currency. Chartists thus magnify exchange rates 
movements. The parameter β1 represents the degree of interpolation. The higher β1, the larger 
the influence of past exchange rate dynamics on chartists’ forecasts. 
 
                                                 
6 The distinguishing feature between the two channels is easily understood with an example taken from Evans 
and Lyons (2008) and Evans (2009). 
7 The interest rate differential has been filtered by a Hodrick Prescott filter because we assume that the dynamics 





t Ψ  represent the effects of collective psychology respectively 
for  fundamentalists  and  chartists.  We  assume  two  definitions  for  this  component.  First 
collective psychology is defined by the appearance of rumours (Dominguez and Panthaki 
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Secondly,  collective  psychology  is  also  materialised  by  the  anchoring  effect 
(Kahneman and Tversky (1974), Osler (2002)). When the exchange rate variation is lower 
than a constant (| st 1| ≤ c), the exchange rate fluctuates around a threshold value following a 
stable random walk (0 < θ < 1). Conversely, if the exchange rate variation is higher than a 
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With 0 < θ < 1 and Λ, a constant 
 
  The  transition  between  the  two  states  is  driven  by  the  following  function: 






The weight that market agents attribute to a given rule depends on the profitability of a 
particular rule. The more profitable a rule, the higher the weight agents attach to this rule. 
Chartist and fundamentalist weights are defined as: 
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    Where ωf,t + ωc,t = 1 and 0 < γ < 1 
 
The parameter γ represents the intensity at which agents revise their forecasting rules. 
When γ → ∞, agents choose the rule which proves to be the most profitable. Conversely, 
when γ → 0, agents keep the rule they are using and are insensitive to the profitability of this 
rule. Thus γ can be viewed as a represention of the status quo bias in agents’ behaviour. The 
status quo bias highlighted by Kahneman and Knetsch (1991) means that when agents use a 
given rule, they find it difficult to change for a different rule. We assume agents need some 
time to change their rule (γ = 0,2). 
 
The profitability π'i,t of each rule is evaluated according to the profit π i,t and the risk 
σ²i,t  associated to a given rule: 
 
    π'i,t = π i,t    σ²i,t             i = c, f                                        (5) 
   11 
  The parameter   represents the coefficient of risk aversion (we set   = 5). The risk 
associated to a forecasting rule is defined as the variance of the forecasting error: 
 
        σ²i,t = [E
i
t 1(st)   st]²        i = c, f                                       (6) 
 
  The profit π i,t related to a forecasting strategy is defined as the one period earnings of 
investing one unit of domestic currency in the foreign asset: 
 
  π i,t = [st(1 + r*)   st 1(1 + r)]sgn[E
i
t 1(st)(1 + r*)   st 1(1 + r)]   i = c, f           (7) 
 









0     x   if   1     sgn[x] 
0     x   if   0   sgn[x] 
0     x   if   1   sgn[x] 
 
 
Thus when agents forecast an appreciation of the foreign currency (an increase in st) 
they will invest in the foreign country. If this appreciation is realised then their profit is equal 
to  the  appreciation  of  the  foreign  currency,  adjusted  by  the  interest  rate  differential. 
Conversely, if the foreign currency depreciates (st decreases) agents will face a loss which 
equals the depreciation of the foreign currency, adjusted by the interest rate differential. 
 
We assume fundamentals have an influence on exchange rate dynamics in the long 
run. More precisely, we assume that the external debt exerts a return force on currency prices 
such  that  the  exchange  rate  returns  towards  its  equilibrium  value  in  the  long  run.  The 
dynamics of the domestic (foreign) external debt  t d  (
*
t d ) are defined as: 
 
      ) s ( d ) i ( ) s ( bc d i d d
final
t t t t t t t t t 1 1 1 1 1 1 − − − − − − + = + + = θ     (8.1) 
 
















t 1 1 1 1 1 1 − − − − − + + = + + = θ     (8.2) 
 
With  t d (
*
t d ),  the  domestic  (foreign)  external  debt;  t i (
*
t i ),  the  domestic  (foreign) 
interest rate;  t bc (
*
t bc ) the domestic (foreign) current account;  t s , the final exchange rate ; θ = 
0,25;  t t t d d ε + = −1  where  t d →  ) , ( N d
2 0 σ and  t ε →  ) , ( N






t d d ε + = −1 ,  where 
*
t d → 
) , ( N * d
2 0 σ and 
*
t ε →  ) , ( N *
2 0 ε σ  (initially we assume  0 1 = = t d ) 
 
  The stock of debt at time t is therefore equal to the stock of debt at time t 1 ( 1 − t d ); plus 
the interest rate bear on the debt ( 1 − t td i ) and the current account balance at time t ( t bc ). The 
current account is related to the exchange rate dynamics by an inverse relationship. Thus 
when the domestic currency appreciates, the  current account worsens and vice versa. We 
assume also that fundamentalists do not take account of the effect of the external debt on the 
exchange rate in their rule. The external debt has here an external effect on exchange rate 
dynamics. In other words, the external debt influences the exchange rate dynamics outside the 
expectations of chartists and fundamentalists.  
 
The expected exchange rate at time t+1 is obtained by aggregating agents’ forecasts in 
the market: 
   12 
Et( st+1) = ωf,tEf,t( st+1) + ωc,tEc,t( st+1) – θ(dt 1   dt 1*)                                       
 




t s 1 + =   ωf,tψ(st   st*) + ωc,tβ st – θ(dt 1   dt 1*) + 
Market
t 1 + ε     (9) 
 
        With θ = 0,25 and initially, d0 = 0 
 
  The  following  rules  provide  the  link  between  the  behavioural  model  and  the 
microstructure  model.  Order  flows  from  fundamentalists  (
f
t OF )  and  chartists  (
c
t OF )  are 
defined as: 
 




t 1 +   = = N.
f
t s 1 +    where  ∈
f
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t 1 +   = = N.
c
t s 1 +      where  ∈
c


















































         (11) 
 
  Therefore, when customers expect an appreciation of the currency, they will buy the 
currency. Conversely, when customers expect a depreciation of the currency, they will sell the 
currency. We assume customers select an optimal dealer. Customers willing to buy the risky 
asset choose the dealer that quotes the minimum price. Conversely, customers willing to sell 
the  risky  asset  choose  the  dealer  that  quotes  the  maximum  price.  The  total  amount  of 
customer order flows at time t is given by: 
 






t OF ) ( OF OF ω ω − + = 1               (12) 
 
 
  Table 3 decomposes the various types of information of the behavioural model. 
 
Table 3: Decomposition of the information contained in the behavioural model  
  Public Fundamental 
Information 
Public Psychological 








t t t t bc , bc , d , d , i , i , s , s  
f
t Ψ  
f
t ε  
Chartist 
Rule 
2 − t s  
c
t Ψ  
c
t ε  
  Private Fundamental 
Information 
Private Psychological 
Information  Noise  
Fundamentalist 
Rule 
) s s ( t t − 1 α  
f
t Ψ 2 α  
f
t ε  
Chartist 
Rule 
) s ( t 2 1 − β  
c
t Ψ 2 β  
c
t ε    13 
 
 
  The  behavioural  model  contains  four  types  of  information:  public  fundamental 
information, private fundamental information, public psychological information and private 
psychological information. 






t t t t bc , bc , d , d , i , i , s , s )  deals  with  information 
concerning  macroeconomic  fundamentals.  Every  agent  has  access  to  public  fundamental 
information. 
Private  fundamental  information  regroups  information  about  fundamentals  that  has 
been analysed or processed by agents. The terms ) s s ( t t − 1 α and  ) s ( t 2 1 − β  describe the model 
of  exchange  rate  determination  in  which  agents  believe.  They  are  related  to  the  internal 
psychology of agents. 
Public psychological information (
f
t Ψ  and 
c
t Ψ ) relates to information about market 
psychology (or market agents behaviours) that can be observed by every agent. This type of 
information is associated to the external psychology of agents and can be illustrated by the 
anchoring effects or incoming rumours. 
Private psychological information (
f
t Ψ 2 α  and 
c
t Ψ 2 β ) defines the weight attributed by 
customers to the psychological component of exchange rate. Intuitively, this weight defines 
the  degree  of  rationality  of  agents.  Agents  with  no  psychological  components  will  be 
considered as more rational than agents who attibute a high weight to this component. 
The parameter εt
f (εt
c) is a white noise that represents unexpected news or unexpected 
behaviours of fundamentalists (chartists). Therefore, the noise parameters can represent either 
public information or private information about fundamental or customers’ behaviours. 
 
4.3 The microstructure model 
 
We follow Lyons (1997) and model the trading mechanism of the foreign exchange 
market with a simultaneous trade model with multiple dealers. We assume the existence of n 
dealers in the market. In this model, dealers are not solely market makers (they match the 




4.3.1 Period 1 of the microstructure model 
 
  Given their information set (public and private signal), dealers set their currency price 











t , 0 ξ → iidN( ;σξ)  and 
Market
t ε → iidN( ;σε)    
 
The first price 
i
t , P 0  set by dealers includes public information about fundamentals st, 
private information proper to the dealer 
i
t , 0 ξ  and unexpected news about fundamentals 
Market
t ε . 
i
t , 0 ξ  is interpreted as a private signal that dealers held concerning the future exchange rate 
dynamics. This private signal induces a difference among prices listed by dealers.   14 
Equation (13) is the start of the direct channel of news incorporation into currency 
prices. Indeed, the price of the currency can change with the arrival of public news (through 
the terms 
Market
t ε ) even if there is no trade in the market (
customers
t OF = 0). 
  Once dealers set their price, customers select their optimal dealers. Customers willing 
to buy the risky asset will choose the dealer that quotes the minimum price. Conversely, 














, fundamentalists trade with dealer i such that:  { }
{ } n i P Max P
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OF , chartists trade with dealer i such that:                { }
{ } n i P Max P










  Notice that some dealers receive orders from customers while other dealers do not. We 
thus face two cases. On the one hand, dealers that receive orders from customers have access 
to private information and include it into their price. On the other hand, dealers that do not 
receive any orders from customers do not have access to private information. Such dealers 
will learn about private information through the hot potato effect i.e. through interdealers 
order  flows  in  period  2.  Therefore  customer  order  flow  is  the  source  of  information 
asymmetry in this model. Thus private information will be reflected into prices only if it is not 
reflected in customer order flows and in interdealer order flows. 
When dealers receive the information from customers, they will try to infer the private 
information contained in order flows. If dealers receive positive (negative) customer order 
flows OFt
f + OFt
c > 0 (OFt
f + OFt
c < 0), they will include a positive (negative) private signal 
+ i
t , 1 ξ (
− i
t , 1 ξ ) in their quoted price
i
t , P 1 . If dealers receive no customer order flows (OFt
f = OFt
c = 
0), they receive no private signal from customers. We assume that the signal 
i
t , 1 ξ  extracted by 
dealers from customer order flows follows a white noise process. The quoted price 
i
t , P 1  by 
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ξ
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i






















Dealers  quote  their  price  simultaneously  and  independently.  Quoted  price  are 
observable and available to all dealers. Each quote is a single price at which the dealer agrees 
both to buy and sell. Equation (15) is the start of the indirect channel in which dispersed or 
private information coming from customers affect currency prices through order flows, based 
on the term
i
t , 1 ξ . 
We define the demand for the risky asset by dealers or the desired stock of currency in 
period 1 for dealer i 
i
t , D1 by: 
   15 
i


























Therefore dealers have access to both public and private information sources. Their 
demand  for  the  risky  asset  depends  on  public  information  st (the  higher  st,  the  more 
appreciated the value of the stock of risky asset, the higher the demand for the risky asset); 
private  information  coming  from  customer  order  flows 
i
t , 1 ξ (the  higher 
i
t , 1 ξ ,  the  higher  the 
incentive for dealers to invest in the risky asset); the private signal that dealers held on the 
future exchange rate dynamics 
i
t , 0 ξ  (the higher 
i
t , 0 ξ , the higher the incentive for dealers to 
invest in the risky asset); and the average price set by dealers in period 1  t , P 1  (the higher the 
price of the risky asset, the lower the demand for the risky asset). 
 
  Dealers  are  also  speculators  in  this  model.  They  benefit  from  the  information 
contained in the received customer orders to take speculative positions. The term γ1
i takes 
account of the speculative dimension of dealers. This term acts as a leverage effect on the 
demand for currencies by dealers. We assume that the willingness to buy or sell currencies for 
dealers depends on the amount bought or sold by their customers. If dealers receive customer 
orders higher than the average order flows received in the past from customers, they will buy 
a higher amount of currencies. Conversely, if dealers receive customer orders lower than the 
average order flows received in the past from customers, they will buy a lower amount of 
currencies.  The  same  reasoning  holds  when  selling  currencies.  Thus,  the  willingness  to 
buy/sell currencies by dealer i is defined by the term γ1






























        (17) 
 
The parameter  d represents the degree of risk aversion of dealers: if  d < 1, dealers are 
risk lover; if  d > 1, dealers are risk averse; if  d = 1, dealers are risk neutral. 
 
Beyond  their  role  of  speculators,  dealers  are  also  market makers.  They  match  the 
demand and supply of currencies by customers. We define the dealer i trading rule 
i
t , T1  in 










t , / T 1 1   ]         (18) 
 
The term 
i T1 depends on 
i D1 , 
i C1  and E[ 
i i T 1
'
1 /  ]. Assume initially that the stock of 
risky assets for dealers is equal to zero. The term 
i T1  is the necessary amount of orders that 
dealers have to pass to other dealers to satisfy their own demand of risky asset given orders 
coming from customers and orders from other dealers. The term
i C1 represents customer order 
flows addressed to dealer i. Customers will be net buyers if 
i C1 > 0. Conversely, customers 
will be net sellers if  
i C1 < 0. Obviously, 




t OF . If the dealer does not receive any 




t OF OF  and 
i C1= 0. As dealers’ trades are simultaneous, 
E[
i i T 1
'
1 /  ] represents the order flows from other dealers expected by dealer i. We define   16 
E[
i i T 1
'
1 /  ] as: E[
i i T 1
'
1 /  ] = 
i '
t , T 1 2 − +
i
t ε . The term 
i '
t , T 1 2 −  represents the net flows received by 
dealer i from other dealers in period 2 
8. The term 
i
t , D1  is the desired stock of currencies by 
dealer i. 
The definition of order flows by dealer i 
i




















t , t P a a a s a 1 4 1 3 0 2 1 − + + ξ ξ + (
f
t OF + 
c
t OF ) + 
i '
t , T 1 2 − + 
i
t ε          (20) 
 
  Dealers  then  choose  to  trade  with  their  optimal  dealers.  Buyer  dealers  will  buy 


















the dealer i trades with dealer j such as:  { }
{ } n j P Max P












1 1     (21) 
 








t , t , T V
1
1 1                (22) 
 
4.3.2 Period 2 of the microstructure model 
 
In  period  2,  dealers  trade  between  each  other.  Their  trades  are  based  on  private 
information contained in order flows. Dealers start to revise their quoted price given their 
updated stock of information. We assume that the price quoted by dealers in period 2 is linked 
to the latest market quote  t , P 1  and to the net interdealer order flows in period 1  t , V1 . This 
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i




















  (23) 
 
Once  dealers  have  set  their  price  in  period  2,  they  define  their  net  demand  for 
currencies in period 2 
i






t , t , t
d
i
t , ) P b V b s b ( D 3
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,  0 < {b1,b2,b3}< 1 and b1 > b3 
 
                                                 
8 Initially, we set 
i '
t , T 1 2 − =0 and E[ 
i i '
t , / T 1 1   ] = 
i
t ε . 

































































  (25) 
 
Hence the demand for currencies in period 2 
i
t , D2 depends on public information st (the 
higher st, the more appreciated the value of the stock of risky asset, the higher the demand for 
the risky asset); interdealer order flows  t , V1 observed by dealers at the end of period 1 (the 
more positive  t , V1 , the more appreciated the value of the stock of risky asset, the higher the 
demand for the risky asset); the average price set by dealers in period 2  t , P2  (the higher the 
price of the risky asset, the lower the demand for the risky asset); private information coming 
from dealers that received customer order flows in period 1 
i
t , 3 ξ (the higher 
i
t , 3 ξ , the higher the 
incentive for dealers to invest in the risky asset). Indeed, in period 2, dealers infer private 
information 
i
t , 3 ξ  from customer order flows through order flows coming from dealers that had 
traded with customers in period 1. Recall that the only way dealers can learn about private 
information from other dealers is through the observation of interdealer order flows. 
 
  Dealers are also speculators. The term γ2 takes account of the speculative dimension of 
dealers. This term acts as a leverage effect on the demand for currencies by dealers. We 
assume the willingness to buy or sell the risky asset for a dealer depends on the amount 
bought or sold by their dealers’ counterparts. Therefore, if a dealer receives orders higher than 
the average flows received in the past, he will buy a higher amount of risky asset. Conversely, 
if a dealer receives orders lower than the average flows received in the past; he will buy a 
lower amount of risky asset. The same reasoning holds when selling currencies. The term γ2
i 































        (26) 
 
The parameter  d represents the degree of risk aversion of dealers: if  d < 1, dealers are 
risk lover; if  d > 1, dealers are risk averse; if  d = 1, dealers are risk neutral. 
 
The dealer trading rule in period 2 is defined as follows:  
 
















t , / T 2 2   ]     (27) 
 
The  term 
i T2 depends  on
i D1 , 
i D2 , 
i '
t , T1 ,  E[ 
i i T 1
'
1 /  ]  and  E[ 
i i ' / T 2 2   ].  The  flows 
(
i i D D 1 2 − )represent a revision by dealer i of the amount invested in currencies. The term 
(
i i D D 1 2 − ) is interpreted as an inventory effect. The inventory effect in turn triggers the hot 
potato  effect.  Hence  agents  pass  their  undesired  positions  to  other  dealers  in  the  market 
through the term
i T2 . Trades in period 2 depend also on the error made by a dealer on the 
expected flows coming from other dealers ( −
i ' T1 E[
i i T 1
'
1 /  ])
10 in period 1 and on the expected 
                                                 
10 The term ( −
i ' T1 E[
i i T 1
'
1 /  ]) represents the effective flows incoming to dealers from other dealers in period 1.   18 
order flows to be received in period 2 (E[ 
i i T 2
'
2 /  ]). The expected flows from other dealers by 
a dealer i is simply equal to flows received by a dealer i in period 1, plus a noise: 
 
E[
i i T 2
'











        With 
i
t ε → iidN( ;σε)     (28) 
 
Therefore, the definition of order flows by a dealer i in period 2 
i T2  is given by: 
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)  (29) 
 
Dealers  then  choose  to  trade  with  their  optimal  dealer.  Buyer  dealers  will  buy 


















the dealer i trade with dealer j such as:  { }
{ } j i , n j P Max P
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              (32) 
 
 
4.4 Stochastic simulations of the model 
 
  We simulate the model over 3000 periods with 50 dealers in the market
11. Figure 1.1 
shows the dynamics of the simulated exchange rate, the fundamental exchange rate and the 
proportion of fundamentalists in the market. Figure 1.2 show the relative profitability of the 












                                                 
11 The values for the exogenous parameters are available in Appendix F, table F.   19 
Figure 1.1: Simulated exchange rate, 
fundamental exchange rate  
























































Figure 1.2: Relative profitability of the 
chartists and the fundamentalist rules  


















































NB: For figure 1.1, the black line represents the simulated exchange rate F (left scale); the grey line represents 
the fundamental exchange rate  s  (left scale); the blue  margins represents periods in  which  fundamentalists 
dominate the market ω (right scale). For figure 1.2, the black line represents the relative profitability between 
the  chartits  rule  and  the  fundamentalist  rule  (π'f,t     π'c,t);  the  blue  margins  represents  periods  in  which 
fundamentalists dominate the market ω (right scale). 
 
 
From figure 1.1, we observe that in the short run, there is a persistent gap between the 
simulated exchange rate F and its fundamental value s . Over the long run, the simulated 
exchange rate returns towards its fundamental value. The heterogeneity of behaviours in the 
market or equivalently the use of different models by agents explains the disconnection of the 
market exchange rate from its fundamental value. When chartists dominate the market (white 
margins), the exchange  rate wanders away from its fundamental value. Conversely, when 
fundamentalists dominate the market (blue margins), the exchange rate returns towards its 
fundamental value. 
As shown in figure 1.2 the domination of a given type of agent in the market depends 
on the the profitability of its proper rule. If the profitability of the chartist rule is higher than 
the profitability of the fundamentalist rule, chartists dominate the market. Conversely, when 
the  fundamentalist  rule  becomes  more  profitable  than  the  chartist  rule,  fundamentalists 
dominate the market. 
  Figure  2.1  and  2.2  shows  the  dynamics  of  the  simulated  exchange  rate  with 
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Figure 2.1: Simulated exchange rate and 





















































Figure 2.2: Simulated exchange rate and 























































NB: For figure 2.1, the black line represents the  simulated exchange rate F (left scale); the dark grey line 
represents customer order flows OF
customer (right scale). For figure 2.2, the black line represents the simulated 
exchange rate F (left scale); the light grey line represents interdealer order flows V2 (right scale). 
 
 
From figures 1.1, 2.1 and 2.2, we obverse that the model replicates three stylised facts 
observed empirically in the foreign exchange market. 
First of all, simulations in figures 2.1 and 2.2 confirm the close link between exchange 
rate  dynamics  and  cumulative  order  flows  at  short  and  long  horizons.  The  coefficient  of 
correlation between the simulated exchange rate and customer order flows (interdealer order 
flows)  amounts  to  99,47  %  (respectively  98,42  %).  This  result  comes  in  line  with  the 
empirical observations by microstructure theorists (Lyons (2001), Evans and Lyons (2001, 
2002a, 2002b), Rime et al. (2010) to cite a few). 
Secondly, the amount of interdealer order flows is larger than the amount of customer 
order flows. This fact is due to the hot potato effect. This phenomenon describes the fact that 
with  the  incoming  stock  of  new  information  dealers  revise  their  demands  of  currencies. 
Revisions in their willing stock of currencies induce inventory imbalances or undesired stock 
of currencies. Dealers get rid of these inventory imbalances by passing them to other dealers. 
As a result, inventory imbalances are passed from dealers to dealers in the market. These 
trades of unwanted positions inflate the amount of flows between dealers in the market. These 
trades further magnify the amount of interdealer order flows relative to the initial amount of 
customer order flows. In the model, the hot potato effect appears in period 2 where dealers 
trade  between  each  other.  The  hot  potato  effect  is  defined  through  the  term 
i T2  by  the 
inventory effect or equivalently the revision of undesired positions on currencies (
i i D D 1 2 − ). 
Such  inventory  effects  are  an  important  feature  of  models  willing  to  address  trading 
mechanism  in  the  foreign  exchange  market.  Indeed,  empirically,  the  hot potato  effect 
represents 60 % of the trades between agents in the foreign exchange market (Lyons (2001)). 
Thirdly, figures 1.1, 2.1 and 2.2 show that in the short run, the simulated exchange rate 
is disconnected from its fundamentals but not from order flows. However, in the long run, the 
dynamics of the simulated exchange rate returns towards its fundamental value and is still 
highly correlated with order flows. This result comes in lines with the one from the theoretical 
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5. Further results from the theoretical model of the foreign exchange market 
 
5.1 Is the foreign exchange market intrinsically inefficient? 
 
According to Fama (1965), a market is considered as informationally efficient if the 
price of an asset is equal to its fundamental value, given all available information at time t. In 
our theoretical model, we define the fundamental value of the exchange rate s  by the interest 
rate differential between the domestic and the foreign country: 
  
t s  =(it – it*)                   (33) 
 
  Figure  3  shows  the  dynamics  of  the  market  exchange  rate  s
market,  the  fundamental 




Figure 3: Market exchange rate (s
market), fundamental exchange rate (s ) 





















































































































NB: The black line represents the market exchange rate (s
market); the dark grey line represents the fundamental 
exchange rate (s ); the light grey line represents the simulated exchange rate or equivalently the final exchange 
rate quoted by dealers (F). 
 
 
  The market exchange rate s
market (which we could label as the behavioural exchange 
rate)  fluctuates  around  its  fundamental  value  s .  In  some  periods,  it  wanders  away  while 
returning to its fundamental value at other periods. The final exchange rate quoted by dealers 
F (which we could label as the microstructure exchange rate) appears even more disconnected 
from the fundamental value than the market exchange rate s
market. 
  Therefore, the final price quoted in the foreign exchange market F does not reflect the 
fundamental  value  s  of  the  asset.  The  behavioural  exchange  rate  and  the  microstructure 
exchange rate are different from the fundamental exchange rate. Thus the foreign exchange 
market can be considered as intrinsically inefficient: the final quoted value of the exchange 
rate will never be equal to the fundamental exchange rate. Indeed, the original information 
that determines the fundamental exchange rate is distorted through agents’ behaviours and   22 
through  the  quotation  process  of  the  final  currency  price  F.  This  information  distortion 
appears at two levels in the model. 
 
  On the one hand, information is distorted by the fact that agents have heterogeneous 
expectations in the market. We label this distortion of information as the behavioural noise. 
The behavioural noise or behavioural component of the final exchange rate F can be split in 
two factors: internal factors and external factors. 
Internal factors represent individual psychology (or psychological factors observable 
at  agents’  level).  Such  factors  include  individual  preferences  (risk  aversion,  proper 
interpretation of news, overreaction to news, learning effects, etc.) but also the specific rules 
used by individuals (heuristics, heterogeneous expectations, technical models, fundamental 
models,  etc.).  For  example,  in  our  model,  internal  factors  are  represented  by  agents’ 
heterogeneous  expectations  or  agents’  heterogeneous  models  (chartist  and  fundamentalist 
rules). 
External factors represent global psychology (or psychological factors observable at a 
global level in the market). They include rumours, mimetism and conventions that influence 
the market. In the model, external factors are considered through the appearance of rumours 
(equation (3.1) and also through the anchoring effect (equation (3.2)). 
Internal and external psychological factors represent the behavioural biases from the 
rational expectation hypothesis (such as anchoring biases, overreaction, etc.). Indeed, REH 
models assume the existence of a representative agent that has homogenous expectations and 
that is bereft of any psychological dimension. 
 
  On the other hand, information is also distorted by the trading mechanism peculiar to 
the foreign exchange market. This point was already highlighted by Lyons (1998). We label 
this  information  distortion  as  the  microstructure  noise.  The  microstructure  noise  or 
microstructure component of the final exchange rate F is induced by two factors: the noise 
brought by the interpretation of private information by dealers and also the noise brought by 
the passing of undesired positions. 
  The noise brought by the interpretation of private information by dealers is illustrated 
as follows. Recall that only a minority of dealers have access to private information. Assume 
that private information from customers comes to a dealer that offers the optimal price for 
customers.  Then  the  chosen  dealer  has  to  infer  the  information  contained  in  order  flows 
coming  from  customers.  The  dealer  provides  a  more  or  less  correct  interpretation  of  the 
original private information contained in customer order flows. The dealer’s interpretation of 
the information is shaped notably by his/her risk aversion and also by his/her desired leverage 
effect
12. The dealer will then transmit his/her interpretation of the original private information 
to another dealer through interdealer order flows. This other dealer will in turn provide a more 
or less correct interpretation of the information contained in the order flows coming from the 
first dealer (and hence a more or less correct interpretation of the original private information 
from the original customer). As a result, if the original private information passes through a 
large amount of dealers   or equivalently if the hot potato effect is large   then the precision of 
the original private information is lowered. The final price will be therefore less revealing of 
the  original  private  information.  Hence,  the  larger  the  hot  potato  effect,  the  higher  the 
information distortion, the lower the efficiency of the foreign exchange market. 
  The noise brought by the passing of undesired positions works as follows. Recall that 
independently of the private information received from customers, dealers adjust also their 
desired positions in the risky asset given their updated stock of information. Although the 
                                                 
12 Hence  the  strategic  or  speculative  behaviour  of  the  dealer  contributes  to  the  distorsion  of  the  original 
information.   23 
passing of unwanted positions have a transitory effect on the price of the currency, they act as 
a noise in interdealer order flows. Indeed, dealers do not know whether order flows coming 
from other dealers define simply unwanted position bereft of any private information from 
customers or if such order flows coming from other dealers contain any elements of private 
information.  Hence  the  passing  of  unwanted  positions  act  as  a  noise  in  the  extraction  of 
private information from customer order flows. As a result, the larger the amount of unwanted 
positions in the market (or equivalently the larger the hot potato), the higher the noise in 
interdealer order flows, the larger the difficulty to extract the original private information 
provided by customers. Therefore the hot potato effect   trading mechanism intrinsic to the 
foreign exchange market   distorts the original private information provided by customers in 
the final currency price and hence alters the efficiency of the foreign exchange market. 
 
As a consequence, the conjunction of behavioural noise (internal factors and external 
factors)  and  microstructure  noise  (either  the  interpretation  of  the  private  information  by 
dealers or the noise brought by the passing of undesired positions) imply that the foreign 
exchange market is intrinsically inefficient. The incoming information is distorted by agents’ 
behaviours and by the trading mechanism peculiar to the foreign exchange market. 
 
5.2 Towards a resolution of the exchange rate disconnection puzzle? 
 
  The exchange rate disconnection puzzle states that the empirical dynamics of currency 
prices are disconnected from their fundamentals. The disconnection puzzle was highlighted 
by Meese and Rogoff (1983). They found that traditional exchange rate models based on a 
linear  and  symmetric  structure  offer  little  explanatory  and  predictive  powers  concerning 
exchange rate dynamics, especially in the short run. 
We mentioned previously that the explanatory power of exchange rate dynamics by 
order flows models far exceeds the one of traditional exchange rate models, especially at short 
horizons. As a result, one may wonder whether order flows models of exchange rate provide 
an answer to the exchange rate disconnection puzzle? 
 
We analyse the fit of order flows versus fundamentals by relying on the simulated 
series from our theoretical model of the foreign exchange market. The simulated exchange 
rate  F  is  the  endogenous  variable.  We  consider  as  exogenous  variables  the  interest  rate 
differential (it   it*) that defines the fundamental exchange rate (s  in the theoretical model) 
and interdealer cumulated order flows Xt (V2 in the theoretical model). All series are non 
stationary in level but stationary in first difference within the 3000 periods of simulations (see 
Appendix  E  for  stationarity  tests).  Regressions  are  based  on  OLS  (with  Newey West 
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Table 4: Empirical tests based on simulated series from  
the theoretical model of the foreign exchange market 
Model 1   st = β0 +  β1   (it   it*) + β2  Xt + εt  Diagnostic Tests 
















Model 2   st = β0 +  β1  Xt + εt  Diagnostic Tests 













Model 3   st = β0 +  β1  (it   it*) + εt  Diagnostic Tests 
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NB: Student statistics are mentioned in square brackets ; p values are mentioned in brackets ; critical values for 
the test of Student amounts to 1,96 at a 5 % confidence level and at 1,64 at a 10 % confidence level. 
 
 
  As expected, table 4 shows that order flows provide a better explanatory power of 
currency movements than fundamentals. Order flows explain a significant part of the variance 
of exchange rate dynamics considered in first difference (R2 is almost at 60 %) contrary to 
fundamentals (R2 is lower than 1 %). 
We compare this theoretical result to the empirical fit of order flows models versus 
traditional models of exchange rate. We rely on the original dataset provided by Evans and 
Lyons (2002)
13. Tests are based on the deutschemark/dollar, yen/dollar and pound/dollar at a 
daily frequency, from the 1
st May 1996 to the 23
rd August 1996. Order flows considered here 
are  interdealer  order  flows.  Because  of  non stationarity,  series  are  considered  in  first 
difference.  Equations  are  estimated  by  OLS  (with  Newey West  correction  for 




















                                                 
13 We ask every distributor entity of order flows but we did not manage to have acces to order flow data. The 
main reason provided by our contacts was that order flows are confidential data.   25 
Table 5: Empirical tests on the original model of Evans and Lyons (2001, 2002) 
Model 1   st = β0 +  β1  (it   it*) + β2  Xt + εt  Diagnostic Tests 














































Model 2   st = β0 +  β1  Xt + εt  Diagnostic Tests 





































Model 3   st = β0 +  β1  (it   it*) + εt  Diagnostic Tests 





































NB: Student statistics are mentioned in square brackets ; p values are mentioned in brackets ; critical values for 
the test of Student amounts to 1,96 at a 5 % confidence level and at 1,64 at a 10 % confidence level. 
 
 
  The theoretical results from table 4 are confirmed in table 5. At daily frequencies, 
order flows models (model 2) provide a better fit of exchange rate dynamics than traditional 
models of exchange rate (model 3). Considering the case of the deutschemark/dollar exchange 
rate, order flows models provide a coefficient of determination (R2) equal to 65 % while the 
coefficient of determination for traditional models of exchange rate amounts to 5 %. 
  The better fit of order flows models holds not only at short horizons (as shown here for 
daily  frequencies)  but  also  for  long  run  horizons.  Indeed,  Berger  et  al.  (2008)  analyse 
interdealer  order  flows  from  January  1999  to  December  2004  on  the  euro/dollar  and  the 
yen/dollar exchange rates. They show that interdealer order flows have a significant impact on 
exchange rate variations in the short and medium run but much less explanatory power for 
long term exchange rate movements. However, although the explanatory power of order flows 
models falls in the long run, Berger et al. (2008) confirm that the explanatory power of order 
flows models is still much higher in the long run than the one of traditional exchange rate 
models.  
Such results suggest that order flows provide an answer to the disconnection puzzle of 
the exchange rate. Indeed order flows contain information about exchange rate fundamentals 
(Chinn and Moore (2008), Evans and Lyons (2005b, 2008), Rime, Sarno and Sojli (2010)). 
The only difference between order flows models and traditional models is that the information 
about exchange rate fundamentals contained in order flows has been processed by market 
agents. Conversely, traditional models only consider raw (or unprocessed) information about 
exchange rate fundamentals. 
 
  Processed information means that information has been treated by agents. Processed 
information  contains  the  weight  attributed  by  agents  to  the  various  types  of  information   26 
included  in  order  flows:  fundamental  information  (public  and  private)  and  behavioural 
information  (public  and  private).  The  trading  process  then  includes  a  third  type  of 
information:  the  microstructure  noise.  Therefore  order  flows  is  defined  as  a  time varying 
weight of fundamental information (public and private), behavioural information (public and 
private)  and  microstructure  information.  In  comparison,  traditional  models  only  consider 
public fundamental information. Order flows Xt can thus be defined as: 
 
Xt = Ft( t, Bt, Mt)                           
 
The term  t represents the stock of information about macroeconomic fundamental 
considered  by  an  agent  at  time  t.  This  variable  includes  public  information  about 
fundamentals. The term Bt stands for the behavioural noise affecting  agents’ decisions.  It 
includes  the  internal  and  external  factors  of  market  psychology.  The  term  Mt  is  the 
microstructure noise. It includes the noise relative to the trading mechanism peculiar to the 
foreign exchange market. 
 
  Therefore,  the  higher  explanatory  and  predictive  powers  of  order  flows  models 
compared  to  traditional  models  of  exchange  rate  is  justified  by  the  fact  that  order  flows 
contain  processed  or  treated  information  while  traditional  models  only  consider  raw 
information. In other words, beyond exchange rate fundamentals, order flows models consider 
the  behavioural  and  microstructure  components  of  exchange  rates.  Conversely,  traditional 
models  ignore  such  components  and  take  only  account  of  the  fundamental  information 
concerning exchange rates. 
Given the importance of the behavioural and the microstructure components at short 
horizons relative to long horizons (see Cheung and Wong (2000), Cheung and Chinn (2001), 
Cheung, Chinn and Marsh (2004) and appendix C), the explanatory power of order flows 
models is far better than the one of traditional exchange rate models in the short run. The 
difference in explanatory power between both models decrease in the long run (but is still in 
favour of order flows models (Berger et al. (2008))) because both the behavioural and the 
microstructure components play a minor role in the determination of the exchange at long run 
horizons  (see  Cheung  and  Wong  (2000),  Cheung  and  Chinn  (2001),  Cheung,  Chinn  and 





This  article  aims  at  understanding  the  determinants  of  order  flows  in  the  foreign 
exchange rate market. We look inside the black box of order flows models to understand why 
order flows provide better explanatory and predictive powers of exchange rate dynamics than 
traditional models. 
  We set a theoretical model that takes account of major stylised facts observed in the 
foreign exchange market. The model is based on two blocks. The first block is a behavioural 
exchange rate model (De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2007)) that provides the characteristics of 
customers faced by dealers. The second block is a microstructure model that represents the 
trading mechanism peculiar to the foreign exchange market. The microstructure model is a 
simultaneous trade model that has a decentralised and multiple dealer structure. 
  Simulations from the model replicate important stylized facts observed empirically in 
the foreign exchange market. 
First, the exchange rate is disconnected from its fundamentals in the short run but not 
from order flows. However, in the long run, the exchange rate returns towards its fundamental   27 
value and is close to order flows. Customer and interdealer order flows are highly correlated 
with  exchange  rate  dynamics  at  all  horizons.  Besides  the  hot  potato  effect  magnifies  the 
amount of interdealer order flows relative to the amount of customer order flows. 
Secondly,  the  model  shows  that  the  foreign  exchange  market  is  intrinsically 
inefficient. Indeed, information is distorted at two levels in the market. On the one hand, 
information is distorted by agents’ behaviours. This behavioural noise is split in two factors: 
internal factors and external factors. Internal factors include notably individual preferences, 
risk  aversion,  overreaction  to  news,  specific  models  used  by  individuals.  External  factors 
cover rumours, mimetism and conventions. On the other hand, information is distorted by the 
trading  mechanism  peculiar  to  the  foreign  exchange  market.  This  microstructure  noise  is 
caused by two factors brought by the hot potato effect: the noise relative to the interpretation 
of  private  information  by  dealers  and  the  noise  generated  by  the  passing  of  undesired 
positions between dealers. 
Thirdly, we argue that order flows models of exchange rate provide an answer to the 
exchange rate disconnection puzzle. Indeed, order flows models contain information that has 
been processed by market agents while traditional models only consider raw (or unprocessed) 
information. Thus, the information in order flows is a time varying weight of fundamental 
information (both public and private), behavioural information (both public and private) and 
microstructure  information.  In  comparison,  traditional  models  only  consider  public 
fundamental information. The difference in the types of information considered by the two 
models explain why order flows models provide higher explanatory and predictive powers of 
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A. Definition of the different types of order flows 
 
Three types of order flows can be found in the foreign exchange market. All three are 
related to the three main agents that operate in the foreign exchange market: brokers, market 
makers and customers. 
Brokers  play  the  role  of  intermediaries  in  the  foreign  exchange  market.  Given  a 
commission, their task is to match buyers and sellers among market makers. Brokers are not 
allowed to take positions in the foreign exchange. Orders between market makers and brokers 
are called brokered interdealer order flows. They are registered in electronic systems such as 
Reuters 3000 Spot Matching or EBS (Electronic Broking Service).  
Market makers negotiate the purchases and sells of currencies with their customers or 
with  other  market makers  directly  or  indirectly  through  brokers.  Orders  between  market 
makers are called direct interdealer order flows. They are registered in Reuters 3000 Dealing 
System. Usually big banks (such as Deutsche Bank, UBS, Barclays Capital, Citigroup, Royal 
Bank  of  Scotland,  JP  Morgan  and  HSBC)  play  the  role  of  market makers.  Contrary  to 
brokers, market makers are allowed to take positions and thus speculate in the market. These 
positions are however limited. These limits are often set by risk managers given the degree of 
experience  of  traders  and  the  degree  of  risk  in  the  market.  Market makers  are  however 
obliged to close their positions by the end of the day. They often transfer their positions to 
customers or market makers situated in other time zones.  
Eventually,  customers  operate  in  the  foreign  market  to  convert  currencies  with  a 
commercial or with a speculative objective. They are represented by non financial companies 
(import export firms, multinationals), institutional investors (pension funds, hedge funds) and 
sometimes central banks. Customers transmit their orders to market makers. Such orders are 
called customer order flows and are registered in electronic systems of private banks.  
One of the most important characteristic of order flows is that order flow is private 
information. They are not released publicly and are only known by a minority of agents. The 
most confidential orders are customer order flows followed by direct interdealer order flows 
and brokered interdealer order flows. 
 
B. Description of the trading mechanism in the foreign exchange market  
 
  Order flow is a variable that provides a sign and an amount to a given transaction in 
the  market.  Buyers  initiated  order  flows  (or  buy  orders)  are  positive  signed  while  sellers 
initiated order flows (or sell orders) are negative signed. Net order flows is the difference 
between buy orders and sell orders on a given period of time. It is usual to consider net 
cumulated  order  flows  to  analyse  the  pressure  on  currency  prices.  Hence  a  positive  net 
cumulated order flow is associated to an  appreciation of a currency while a negative net 
cumulated order flow is associated to a depreciation of a currency. 
According to Lyons (2001), order flow can be viewed as a mechanism that conveys 
private information into currency prices. Private information is information that is only known 
by  a  minority  of  agents  in  the  market.  A  simple  example  is  provided  to  illustrate  the 
transmission of information in currency prices through order flow. 
For  sake  of  simplicity,  we  assume  that  every  order  has  an  aggressive  part  (Kyle 
(1985), Glosten and Milgrom (1985)) and ignore the existence of a limit order book. This 
assumption is relevant theoretically but not relevant empirically since not all order have an 
aggressive part empirically and dealers do have a limit order book.   32 
 
Figure B: The transmission of information in currency prices through order flows 
 
  Source: Marsh and O’Rourke (2005) 
 
 
Suppose  that  the  market  is  initially  in  equilibrium.  Customer  1  analyses  the 
fundamentals of the US dollar and finds that the dollar is over appreciated against the euro. 
Customer 1 thus expects a depreciation of the dollar and decides to sell her stock of dollars 
against euro for 5 millions. Customer 1 hence gives a sell order of  5 to market maker A. 
Market maker  A  is  observing  the  order  flow  transmitted  by  customer  1  and  infers  the 
information contained in the order flow. If the market maker thinks that the customer sells her 
currency because of a worsening of macroeconomic fundamentals, he will then lower his 
listed price for the US dollar. Therefore, private information contained in customer 1’s order 
flow is thus introduced in the price of the currency. At this stage, cumulated order flow and 
net demand in the market are both equal to  5. 
  Customer 2 is willing to buy 1 million dollars to market maker A. The cumulated 
order flow and the net demand are both equal to  4. Market maker A sells his whole stock of 
dollars to market maker B. Market maker B infers the negative information contained in the 
flows provided by market maker A and decreases her price. Cumulated order flow decreases 
to  8 while net demand in the market remains unchanged at  4. 
This mechanism will repeat itself for market makers C, D and E. As market makers 
take knowledge of the negative information contained in order flows, they decrease the price 
of the dollar in the market. Finally, the last transaction is materialised by an order of +2 from 
customer 4. Cumulated order flow amounts to  12 while net demand is equal to zero. The 
market reaches a new equilibrium where customer 4 buys dollars at a new equilibrium price 
(i.e. at a lowered price).  
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Table B: The transmission of information in currency prices through order flows 










1  Customer 1  MM A    5    5    5    5 
2  Customer 2  MM A  + 1    4    4 (=   5 + 1)    4 (=   5 + 1) 
3  MM A  MM B    4    8    4 (=   4 + 0)    4 
4  MM B  MM C    4    12    4 (=   4 + 0)    4 
5  Client 3  MM C  + 2    10    2 (=   4 + 2)    2 (=   4 + 2) 
6  MM C  MM D    2    12    2 (=   2 + 0)    2 
7  MM D  MM E    2    14    2 (=   2 + 0)    2 
8  Customer 4  MM E  + 2    12  0 (=   2 + 2)  0 (=   2 + 2) 
Source: Marsh et O’Rourke (2005) ; MM stands for Market Maker 
 
 
Three observations can be highlighted from the above example.  
First and along the lines of Lyons (2001), order flows is a mechanism that transmits 
private  information  into  currency  prices.  Indeed  private  information  about  dollars 
fundamentals from customer 1 is spread in the market and included in currency prices through 
order  flows  between  market makers.  Once  all  the  market makers  took  knowledge  of  the 
negative information, the price of the currency reaches a new equilibrium. 
  Secondly, table B shows that net demand is strictly equal to cumulated customer order 
flows. This is due to the assumptions that every order has an aggressive part and also to the 
exclusion of a limit order book. Had we assume that all trades are not aggressive and also that 
dealers possess a limit order book, customer order flow would not have been strictly equal to 
net  demand.  Customer  order  flows  are  the  main  source  of  information  in  the  market. 
Information from customer order flows is then redistributed among market makers. These 
redistributions  of  information  take  place  through  the  transfer  of  unwanted  positions  of 
currencies by market makers. They explain the high volume of transactions between dealers 
in  the  foreign  exchange  market  (the  so called  hot  potato  effect).  However,  transactions 
between  market makers  provide  no  additional  information  in  the  market  relative  to  the 
original private information contained in customer order flows. Transactions between market 
makers provide only transitory information through liquidity effects.  
Thirdly, transactions between market makers inflate the amount of flows in the market 
(as shown in the fifth column of table B related to cumulated order flow). Such flows magnify 
the effect the initial order flow by customer 1. Hence if the price decreases as it was the case 
in the previous example, cumulated order flows decrease further more. In the above example, 
an initial customer order of  5 induces a final cumulated order flow of  12. Given the fact that 
the  price  has  decreased  between  the  first  equilibrium  and  the  second  equilibrium,  there 
appears a high correlation between exchange rate and net cumulated order flows. This high 
correlation  justifies  the  use  of  order  flows  as  an  explanatory  variable  of  exchange  rate 
dynamics. 
 
C. The importance of investor psychology at short run horizons 
 
  Beyond macroeconomic fundamentals, one of the major components of exchange rates 
in the short run is market psychology (Keynes (1936), Hopper (1998)). The importance of this 
component has been justified by numerous surveys. 
 
Cheung and Wong (2000) survey operators in the foreign exchange market in Tokyo, 
Hong  Kong  and  Singapore  between  October  1995  and  January  1996.  They  found  that  at 
intraday frequencies exchange rates are exclusively driven by non fundamental components   34 
(at 99,30 %): speculative forces (30,82 %), over reaction (24,40 %) and bandwagon effect 
(24,40 %). In the medium run (shorter than 6 months) factors driving exchange rates are 
successively  technical  trading  (39,75  %),  economic  fundamentals  (32,14  %),  speculative 
forces (14,0 %) and bandwagon effects (12,13 %). Hence, non fundamental components still 
play a major role in explaining exchange rate dynamics (at 67,86 %). In the long run (longer 
than 6 months), operators consider that economic fundamentals are the main determinants of 
exchange rates (at 79,56 %). 
 
Table C.1: Factors determining exchange rate movements (Cheung and Wong (2000)) 
Factors  Intraday  Medium Run  Long Run 
Bandwagon Effects  24,40  12,13  0,84 
Over Reaction to news  30,16  1,98  0,20 
Speculative Forces  30,82  14,0  2,30 
Economic Fundamentals  0,70  32,14  79,56 
Technical Trading  13,92  39,75  17,1 
Source: Cheung and Wong (2000); Percentages of respondents in each category are mentioned. 
 
Cheung  and  Chinn  (2001)  survey  traders  operating  in  the  United  States  foreign 
exchange market between October 1996 and November 1997. At intraday frequencies, factors 
that best explain exchange rate dynamics are over reaction (30,45 %), bandwagon effects 
(28,20 %) and speculative forces (25,51 %). Hence exchange rates are driven exclusively by 
non fundamental components (at 98,56 %). In the medium run (up to 6 months) although 
economic fundamentals gain some importance (32,10 %), more than 66 % of respondents give 
credit to non fundamental forces to explain exchange rate movements. Such non fundamental 
forces  include  technical  trading  (30,52  %),  speculative  forces  (23,68  %)  and  bandwagon 
effects (10,52 %). In the long run (over 6 months), operators consider that exchange rates are 
determined in majority by economic fundamentals (at 87,40 %). 
 
Table C.2: Factors determining exchange rate movements (Cheung and Chinn (2001)) 
Factors  Intraday  Medium Run  Long Run 
Bandwagon Effects  28,20  10,52  3,93 
Over Reaction to news  30,45  2,10  0 
Speculative Forces  25,51  23,68  2,36 
Economic Fundamentals  0,82  32,10  87,40 
Technical Trading  14,40  30,52  3,14 
Other  0,62  1,08  3,17 
Source: Cheung and Chin (2001); Percentages of respondents in each category are mentioned. 
 
The same results can be found in Cheung, Chinn and Marsh (2004) who survey the 
United  Kingdom  foreign  exchange  market  from  March  1998  to  April  1998.  At  intraday 
frequencies,  non fundamental  forces  determine  exchange  rates  (at  97,7  %);  mainly  over 
reaction to news (32,8 %), bandwagon effect (29,3 %) and speculative forces (25,3 %). In the 
medium run (within 6 months), non fundamental forces play a major role in the determination 
of exchange rates (67,2 %) even if economic fundamentals gain importance (31,4 %). In the 
long run (over 6 months), economic fundamentals are the major determinant of exchange 
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Table C.3: Factors affecting exchange rates (Cheung, Chinn and Marsh (2004)) 
Factors  Intraday  Medium Run  Long Run 
Bandwagon Effects  29,3  9,5  1 
Over Reaction to news  32,8  0,7  0 
Speculative Forces  25,3  30,7  3,1 
Economic Fundamentals  0,6  31,4  82,5 
Technical Trading  10,3  26,3  11,3 
Other  1,7  1,5  2,1 




D. Stationarity tests for series considered in the original  model of  Evans and Lyons 
(2001, 2002) (model (1)) 
 
Stationarity tests are based on three tests: the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test, 
the Phillips Perron (PP) test and the Kwiatkowski Phillips Schmidt Shin (KPSS) test. Results 
are presented in tables D.1 and D.2. 
 
Table D.1: Stationarity tests for endogenous variables  st 
Currencies  ADF  PP  KPSS 
Deutschemark   8,84 
(0,00) 
 8,87 
(0,00)  0,08*** 
Pound   8,95 
(0,00) 
 8,98 
(0,00)  0,03*** 
Yen   9,45 
(0,00) 
 9,45 
(0,00)  0,09*** 
NB: For the ADF test the Akaike criteria with 2 lags is considered; p values are mentioned in parenthesis; stars 
denote a stationary series at a 1 % (***), 5 % (**), 10 %(*) confidence level. 
 
Table D.2: Stationarity tests for exogenous variables 
Variables   (it   it*)   Xt 
Currencies  ADF  PP  KPSS  ADF  PP  KPSS 
Deutschemark   8,72 
(0,00) 
 8,71 
(0,00)  0,06***   9,51 
(0,00) 
 9,50 
(0,00)  0,07*** 
Pound   8,75 
(0,00) 
 8,75 
(0,00)  0,10***   6,89 
(0,00) 
 6,92 
(0,00)  0,07*** 
Yen   7,91 
(0,00) 
 7,90 
(0,00)  0,04***   7,57 
(0,00) 
 7,60 
(0,00)  0,18*** 
NB: For the ADF test the Akaike criteria with 2 lags is considered; p values are mentioned in parenthesis; stars 
denote a stationary series at a 1 % (***), 5 % (**), 10 %(*) confidence level. 
 
 
E. Stationarity tests for simulated series from the theoretical model 
 
Stationarity tests are based on three tests: the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test, 
the Phillips Perron (PP) test and the Kwiatkowski Phillips Schmidt Shin (KPSS) test. Results 
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Table E: Stationarity tests for endogenous variable and exogenous variables simulated 
by the theoretical model 
Variables  ADF  PP  KPSS 




(0,38)  1,27 




(0,85)  0,34 




(0,25)  1,27 




(0,00)  0,04* 




(0,31)  0,18*** 




(0,00)  0,04* 
NB: For the ADF test the Akaike criteria with 2 lags is considered; p values are mentioned in parenthesis; stars 
denote a stationary series at a 1 % (***), 5 % (**), 10 %(*) confidence level. 
 
F. Definition of the exogenous parameters set for the simulations 
 
  Table F presents the parameters values set to run the simulations of the theoretical 
model of the foreign exchange rate market. The model was calibrated. The main sources for 
parameter vamues were De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2007) for the heterogeneous agent model 
and Lyons (1997) for the microstructure model. 
 
Table F: Parameters values used in the theoretical model 
Agents  Parameters  Base Scenario 
Customers 
Time t 
α1  0,6 
α2  0,2 
β1  0,9 
β2  0,4 
θ  
(0<θ < 1)  0,5 
Λ  5 
γ  0,2 
   5 




n  50 
 d  2 
γ1
i  γ1




t F O OF < ;  
γ1




t F O OF >  
a1 
(0< a1< 1)  0,9 
a2 
(0< a2< 1)  0,3 
a4 











t , T T 1 1 < ;  
γ2




t , T T 1 1 >  
b1 
(0< b1< 1)  0,8 
b2 
(0< b2< 1)  0,3 
b3 
(0< b3< 1)  0,2   37 
 